The Hazards of a Concept of Nonconceptualisation

The Hazards of a Concept of Nonconceptualisation:
Subtle Reification and the Integrity of the Dzogchen View

Within the living traditions of Dzogpachenpo, the rhetoric of nonconceptuality (rtog med) is often invoked to highlight the immediacy and uncontrived nature of the Great Perfection. “Nonconceptual realisation,” “beyond conceptual mind,” “resting nonconceptually in the state of rigpa”: Such phrases point toward a directness that many practitioners feel distinguishes Dzogchen from other Buddhist approaches.

Yet there is a tension here that deserves careful examination. Dzogchen frequently emphasises that its own presentation of the Ground (gzhi) is unique precisely because it avoids the reification that allegedly characterises other schools. While Yogācāra is said to reify the all-basis (kun gzhi), and some versions of Madhyamaka are portrayed as clinging to a purely negative emptiness, Dzogchen claims to articulate a ground that is neither thing nor non-thing, neither existent nor non-existent.

But within this very insistence, a danger hides in plain sight:

the concept of nonconceptualisation itself can become a conceptual construct: one that is weaponised to defend Dzogchen as the “correct view” while subtly entrenching the very reification it claims to avoid.

This essay explores that pitfall and shows how a deeper, more subtle understanding, aligned with Longchenpa, Mipam, and the classical Madhyamaka masters, can strengthen, not weaken, the integrity of Dzogchen practice.

I. When Nonconceptuality Becomes a Concept

1. The Performative Paradox

The moment we speak of “nonconceptuality,” we have named something. Naming is conceptualisation. Designating a word to refer to an absence of conceptual elaboration (spros bral) inevitably creates a conceptual frame around that absence. This is the classical performative paradox also noted by Nāgārjuna:

• To say “it cannot be spoken” is already to speak.

• To say “the ground is beyond conceptual elaboration” is to conceptualise its nonconceptuality.

Thus, when Dzogchen texts and teachers emphasise that “Dzogchen is beyond conceptual elaboration,” they are not describing an object but pointing beyond words.

Practitioners sometimes misinterpret this as:

“Dzogchen has the superior view because it affirms nonconceptuality, whereas others rely on concepts.”

This very assertion is conceptual. And if defended too strongly, it becomes a reified view of non-view: a contradiction that can quietly distort practice.

2. The Reification of Anti-Reification

A subtle form of pride can enter:

“Dzogchen does not reify the ground, unlike those other schools.”

But the claim that Dzogchen alone avoids reification can itself be a form of reification, since it implicitly posits an epistemic superiority, a special ontological category, or a final doctrinal location from which judgment is made.

Mipam Rinpoche warns directly of this in his Beacon of Certainty (nges shes sgron me). He notes that even the view of nonfoundationality (gtan tshigs med pa) can become a “thinly disguised foundation” when grasped conceptually. Madhyamaka likewise cautions that even the ultimate truth of emptiness can become a “poisoned snake” if grasped.

The point is clear in both traditions:

To grasp the conceptual idea of nonconceptuality is still grasping.

II. Reifying the Ground in the Name of Non-Reification

1. Dzogchen’s Presentation of the Gzhi

Dzogchen texts describe the gzhi as:

• ka dag (primordially pure),

• lhun grub (spontaneously present),

• thugs rje (unimpeded compassionate responsiveness).

When understood experientially, this does not posit a metaphysical essence. It is a description of how things are when recognised in their natural state.

But when this is translated into a doctrinal identity, some thinkers fall into the trap of thinking:

“Dzogchen affirms the ground, but only in a way that is beyond all the problems of other systems. Therefore Dzogchen is correct.”

This is not the view of Dzogchen. This is the view of someone defending Dzogchen conceptually.

2. The Naming of the Ground

The moment we say “Gzhi is not reified,” we have affirmed an entity called “Gzhi” whose non-reification becomes a predicate. This destabilises itself logically, because:

• If the gzhi is named as something that avoids reification,

• Then it is an attribute of an entity,

• Which is itself a reification.

Classical Madhyamaka would call this “the reification of the absence of reification.”

Longchenpa calls it “the subtle grasping at the ground as ground.”

Mipam calls it “imputing a basis where there is none.”

Thus, the danger is not merely semantic. It is existential: a subtle form of clinging that is harder to see than gross reification.

III. The Intellectual Hazard of Nonconceptuality

1. Nonconceptuality as a Tool of Distinction

Dzogchen is often distinguished from:

• Yogācāra (“they reify the all-basis”),

• Svātantrika Madhyamaka (“they rely on autonomous reasoning”),

• Prāsaṅgika Madhyamaka (“mere negation lacks luminosity”),

• Tantric systems (“still tied to ritual constructs”).

The rhetorical differentiation has historical value, but it can become philosophically misleading when nonconceptuality is wielded like a badge of purity. The identity of nonidentity is still identity.

2. Defensive Conceptualisation

Sometimes practitioners use the rhetoric of nonconceptuality to avoid philosophical inquiry:

• Asked to explain how the gzhi is not reified, they say: “Well, Dzogchen is beyond concepts.”

• Asked how Dzogchen avoids the logical problems that apply to Yogācāra or Madhyamaka, they say: “Those are merely conceptual systems. Dzogchen transcends them.”

• Asked to clarify contradictions, they say: “You cannot grasp Dzogchen with the mind.”

What begins as a gesture toward ineffability becomes a shield against critical reflection.

Mipam warns that this is a pitfall:

“To refuse analysis is not wisdom. To analyse without remainder is not bondage.”

Dzogchen is not anti-intellectual; it is trans-intellectual. But one cannot genuinely transcend intellect by using intellect to declare transcendence as a doctrine.

IV. How Dzogchen Avoids These Dangers

1. The Union of Emptiness and Appearance (snang stong zung ’jug)

Dzogchen does not affirm a ground that exists beyond conceptuality. Rather, it points to the inseparability of:

• the empty nature (ka dag),

• the luminous display (lhun grub),

• and the dynamic responsiveness (thugs rje).

The unity of these does not stand as a metaphysical entity. It is the way reality is experienced when not filtered through conceptual imputation.

Dzogchen, like Madhyamaka, insists that:

• the ground is not an ontological foundation,

• emptiness is not a nihilistic void,

• luminosity is not a substance,

• awareness is not a self-existing entity.

Longchenpa is explicit:

“The ground is not something that exists as the ground.
Recognising the ground is to recognise that there is no ground.”

This is not a trick of language. It is a phenomenological insight.

2. Nonconceptuality as a Function, Not a Concept

Properly understood:

• Nonconceptuality (rtog med) is not the object of meditation.

• Nonconceptuality is not a philosophical claim.

• Nonconceptuality is not a state.

• Nonconceptuality is not a rhetorical weapon.

It is simply the natural mode of rigpa.

Concepts may arise, they self-liberate. Conceptuality itself becomes nonconceptual in its display. “Nonconceptuality” is not opposed to conceptuality; it is the freedom of whatever arises.

Mipam expresses this beautifully:

“When thought frees itself as appearance,
that freedom is nonconceptual.”

This avoids reification altogether.

3. Other Schools Are Not “Less Than” Dzogchen

Dzogchen is not superior because it is nonconceptual. Madhyamaka does not cling to concepts. Yogācāra does not worship the all-basis. These are caricatures that practitioners sometimes use to defend their own corner.

When properly understood:

• Madhyamaka’s emptiness is inseparable from luminosity.

• Yogācāra’s ālaya is conventionally posited and ultimately empty.

• Dzogchen simply describes the direct experiential recognition of what both are pointing toward.

The difference is not ontological. It is pedagogical and phenomenological.

Understanding this dissolves the need to weaponise nonconceptuality.

V. A Vision for Dzogchen Practitioners

1. Honesty in View, Humility in Practice

The Dzogchen view shines brightest when held with humility:

• not as a doctrine to defend,

• not as a superiority to claim,

• not as a badge of distinction,

• but as a skilful means for recognising the nature of one’s own mind.

When practitioners stop defending Dzogchen, Dzogchen defends itself.

2. Nonconceptuality as Spaciousness, Not Identity

Rather than merely saying “Dzogchen is nonconceptual,” we can say:

• Dzogchen reveals the spaciousness in which concepts arise.

• Dzogchen shows the self-liberation of conceptuality.

• Dzogchen frees the mind from clinging to nonconceptuality.

This keeps the view dynamic, flexible, and alive.

3. A Dzogchen View of the Ground That Is Not a Ground

The most beautiful and liberating insight of Dzogchen is not that the ground is “nonconceptual,” but that:

• liberation is immediate,

• awareness is innately free,

• nothing needs to be added or removed,

• saṁsāra and nirvāṇa are not two,

• and the ground is not an object.

Mipam summarises:

“When the ground is not grasped,
it is seen to be groundlessness.
This is the ground of Dzogchen.”