Candrakīrti on “own-being” or inherent essence
iha svo bhāvaḥ svabhāva iti yasya padārthasya yadātmīyaṃ rūpaṃ tat tasya svabhāva iti vyapadiśyate । kiṃ ca kasyātmīyaṃ yad yasyākṛtrimam, yat tu kṛtrimaṃ na tat tasyātmīyaṃ tadyathā apāmauṣṇyam । yacca yasyāyattaṃ tadapi tadātmīyaṃ tadyathā sve bhṛtyāḥ, svāni dhanāni । yat tu yasya parāyattaṃ na tattasyātmīyaṃ tadyathā tāvatkālikāyācitakam asvatantram । yataś caivaṃ kṛtrimasya parasāpekṣasya ca svabhāvatvaṃ neṣṭam, ata eva auṣṇyam agner hetupratyayapratibaddhatvāt pūrvam abhūtvā paścādutpādena kṛtakatvān na svabhāva iti yujyate । yataś caitadevam, ato yadevāgneḥ kālatraye'pyavyabhicāri nijaṃ rūpam akṛtrimam, pūrvam abhūtvā paścād yanna bhavati, yacca hetupratyayasāpekṣaṃ na bhavati apāmauṣṇyavat pārāvāravat dīrghahrasvavad vā, tat svabhāva iti vyapadiśyate । kiṃ khalu agneḥ taditthaṃ svarūpamasti? na tadasti, na cāpi nāsti svarūpataḥ । yadyapi evam, tathāpi śrotṛṇāmuttrāsaparivarjanārthaṃ saṃvṛtyā samāropya tadastīti brūmaḥ ।
Here, svabhāva (“own-being”) means the own-form (ātmīya rūpa) of any given entity — that is, that characteristic or nature which truly belongs to it. Whatever is proper to a thing, that is called its svabhāva.
Now, what truly “belongs” (ātmīya) to something is that which is unproduced, non-artificial (akṛtrima).
What is produced or fabricated (kṛtrima) does not truly belong to it — as, for example, heat (uṣṇatā) does not belong to water (apām).
Water’s warmth is not intrinsic; it arises from external causes.
Moreover, whatever depends upon oneself (āyatta), that also is considered one’s own — as, for instance, one’s servants or one’s wealth.
But that which depends upon something else (parāyatta) is not truly one’s own — like something borrowed or temporarily requested, which is not independent.
Since, therefore, what is artificial (kṛtrima) or dependent upon others (parasāpekṣa) is not accepted as svabhāva, it follows that the heat of fire (agni-auṣṇyam) — being dependent upon causes and conditions (hetu-pratyaya-pratibaddhatvāt), not existing previously but only coming into being later through production — is artificial (kṛtaka), and therefore not its svabhāva. Thus it is reasonable to say that it lacks inherent nature.
And since this is so, that which in the case of fire would be:
unchanging across the three times (past, present, and future),
its own nature (nija-rūpa),
unproduced (akṛtrima),
not arising later having not existed before,
and not dependent on causes and conditions (hetu-pratyaya-sāpekṣa),
— like the heat of water, or the depth of the ocean, or length and shortness,
that alone would properly be called its svabhāva.
Now, does fire in fact have such a nature — an intrinsic being (svarūpa) of this kind?
It does not exist — and yet it does not not exist, in terms of its own nature. (i.e. fire has no independent essence, but it functions conventionally)
Even though this is the case (that it has no inherent nature), still —
to avoid the confusion or fear of the listeners,
we superimpose (samāropya) its existence in conventional terms (saṃvṛtyā) and say:
“Yes, fire exists.”
